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October 27, 2012 - No. 40 50th Anniversary of 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis The Need to Resolutely Defend Sovereignty and the Rights of All -- End the Blockade of Cuba!   50th
Anniversary
of
1962
Cuban
Missile
Crisis 50th Anniversary of 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis The Need to Resolutely Defend Sovereignty and the Rights of All -- End the Blockade of Cuba! Thousands of University of British Columbia students demonstrate against U.S. actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 24, 1962. October 16 to October 29 marks the 50th anniversary of what is called the "Cuban Missile Crisis" when the world faced an imminent danger of nuclear war as a result of the confrontation between the two superpowers at that time, the United States and the Soviet Union. The events have been rendered as a distorted Cold War account in which the United States emerges as the hero while the facts are mostly hidden or distorted. Why Soviet missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were set up in Cuba with the permission of the Cuban government and how the crisis was resolved are mostly not explored. During these events, the U.S. ruling circles also prepared a major military strike against Cuba -- possibly involving nuclear weapons -- to "take out" the missiles.[1] The U.S. imperialists were of course applying their usual double standard because as of May 1962 they had deployed Jupiter IRBM nuclear missiles in Turkey which threatened the Soviet Union. The crisis ostensibly ended when the Soviets dismantled the missile sites in Cuba and shipped the missiles back to the Soviet Union or, depending on the rendering, when the U.S. was forced by events to dismantle the missiles in Turkey, thus leading the Soviet Union to dismantle its missiles in Cuba. We are told that hardliners wanted Cuba invaded to stop the threat, while luckily U.S. President John F. Kennedy wanted to give diplomacy a chance. The role played by Nikita Khruschev is largely distorted while Kennedy was portrayed then and continues to be portrayed today as the great peacemaker of the era, even while the U.S. escalated aggression against the people of Viet Nam, increasing U.S. troop numbers from 500 to 16,000. In such accounts, revolutionary Cuba is a mere footnote, a fly to be swatted away. The clear implication then was the same as it is today -- that a small country like Cuba should not stand up to the imperialists because such resistance might ignite a world war.
The U.S. imperialists had long considered Latin America,
including Cuba,
to be their personal domain.[2] The Monroe Doctrine of
1823 stated that
efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere with states
in the
Americas would be viewed as acts of aggression, requiring U.S.
intervention.
The Spanish-American war of 1898 substituted U.S. domination of Cuba
for
Spanish domination. Cuba was declared nominally independent in 1902
after
signing the notorious Platt Amendment which gave the U.S. the right to
intervene in Cuban affairs. But prior to the 1959 revolution, Cuban
leaders
rarely made important decisions without consulting the U.S. ruling
circles.
U.S. monopolies, the Mafia,[3] and the CIA[4]
dominated the Cuban economy,
mainly through manipulating the sugar industry. The historic Cuban Revolution of January 1, 1959, sent
the imperialists
into a frenzy and on April 17, 1961, the U.S. launched an unsuccessful
invasion at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Girón), Cuba, with the full
backing of the
"peacemaker" Kennedy, in an attempt to destroy the revolution by armed
force.
Cuban forces quickly routed the U.S. invaders. In retaliation for their
defeat,
at the Punta del Este meeting of the U.S.-dominated Organization of
American
States (OAS) in January 1962, the U.S. spearheaded the passing of an
arms
embargo against Cuba and on February 3, President Kennedy declared an
embargo against trade with Cuba. The U.S. blockade of Cuba continues to
the
present day even though it has been opposed by the vast majority of the
world's people for decades on the basis that only the Cuban people have
the
right to decide their political and economic system.[5] The real essence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was Cuba's staunch defence, under the revolutionary leadership of its legendary leader Fidel Castro, of its sovereignty and rights in the face of continuing U.S. provocation and aggression. The U.S. imperialists used the excuse of "national security" to justify their crimes, giving themselves the right to decide what Cuba could do within its own borders, including what weapons Cuba should have. Before and during the crisis the U.S. flew regular flights over Cuba in U-2 spy planes which routinely violated Cuban airspace,[6] sent agents into Cuba, carried out economic sabotage, performed naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea in close proximity to Cuba with the intent to intimidate, and broadcasted anti-Cuba propaganda. The U.S. never accepted the right of the Cuban people to determine their own destiny and had plans to destroy the revolution right from the day of victory. As well, the U.S. continued to illegally occupy the Guantanamo Naval Base on Cuban territory which it does to the present day.
On October 30, 1962, the day after the Soviet Union
agreed to dismantle
the missile sites in Cuba and remove the missiles, United Nations
Secretary-General U Thant approached Cuban Premier Fidel Castro with
the
arrogant demands which the U.S. had put forth to "help resolve the
crisis." U
Thant stated that the U.S. wanted two teams of United Nations
representatives
created -- one in an airplane and one on land -- to inspect the
dismantling of
the missile ramps in Cuba, which the Soviet Union was carrying out. The
U.S.
stated that if Cuba agreed to the U.S. demand for monitoring of the
missile
sites, the U.S. would agree not to invade Cuba and to end the illegal
blockade.
In other words, the U.S. would not commit acts of aggression and would
abide
by international law only if Cuba fell to its knees before U.S. demands! Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro justly replied to U Thant[7] that Cuba was upholding international law while the U.S. was cynically violating it: "We do not understand at all why this is asked of us, since we have not violated any right, we have not committed aggression against anyone. All our acts have been based on international law, we have done absolutely nothing outside the norms of international law. On the contrary we have been victims, in the first place, of a blockade which is an illegal act; in the second place of the presumption to determine from another country what we can or cannot rightfully do within our own borders." Prime Minster Castro continued, firmly asserting Cuba's rights as a sovereign state: "We understand Cuba is neither more nor less of a sovereign state than any other member state of the United Nations, enjoying all the attributes inherent in those states. Besides, the United States has repeatedly violated our air space without any right, committing an intolerable act of aggression against our country. It has tried to justify this by an agreement of the Organization of American States but that agreement has no validity for us. We have, moreover, been expelled from the OAS. We can accept anything which is according to law, anything which does not infringe upon our condition as a sovereign state. The rights that were violated by the United States have not been re-established and we do not accept any imposition of force. "
Prime Minister Castro then dismissed the request for inspection as a further attack on Cuba's sovereignty and rights. "I understand that this question of inspection is a further attempt to humiliate our country. Therefore we do not accept it. The demand of inspection is intended to confirm its presumption to violate our right to act with complete freedom within our own frontiers, our right to decide what we can or cannot do within our own borders. And our present line is not one made up for this occasion; it is a point of view which we have always and invariably maintained." Prime Minister Castro also reminded U Thant that Cuba's just stand had already been made very clear in the Revolutionary Government's reply to the October 22 Joint Resolution of the U.S. Congress announcing the blockade: "It is absurd to threaten a direct armed attack, in the event of Cuba's strengthening itself militarily to a degree which the United States takes on itself to specify. We have not the least intention of informing or consulting the U.S. Senate or House as to the weapons we see fit to acquire and the measures to be taken to defend our country properly. Are we not supported in this by the rights which international norms, laws and principles recognize for every sovereign state throughout the world? We have not granted the U.S. Congress any sovereign prerogative, nor do we intend to do so. This point of view was reaffirmed in the United Nations by the President of the Republic of Cuba and also has been repeatedly proclaimed by me in numerous public statements as Prime Minister of the government. And it is a firm stand of the Cuban government." Prime Minister Castro concluded by reasserting Cuba's
vow to always
defend its sovereign rights: "All these steps have been taken to ensure
the
security of our country, in the face of a systematic policy of
hostility and
aggression; they have been taken in full accordance with the law, and
we have
not renounced our decision to defend our rights. We can negotiate with
all
sincerity and honesty. We should not be honest if we agreed to
negotiate a
sovereign right of our country. For these rights we are ready to pay
whatever
price is necessary and this is not a mere verbal formula but the very
deeply
felt attitude of our people." Far from being a paean to the so-called peacemaking of President Kennedy and U.S. imperialism, Prime Minister Castro's incisive remarks show the significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis: it showed once again that it was then and continues to be today thanks to the Cuban people's militant defence of their sovereignty that the U.S. imperialists are unable to prevail. They are the real warmongers and the real road to peace in the world is that which guarantees the rights of the peoples and the decision of the peoples to resist in defence of these rights. The people of Cuba were determined to continue to defend their rights in the face of all difficulties, even when threatened by the most powerful country in the world. "Cuba stands as a symbol of the struggle for liberation and independence that imperialism is striving to annihilate. Nothing stimulates Cubans more than their determination to stay in permanent combat in defence of their identity, culture and life itself, as sovereign nation and the master of its own destiny."[8]
Notes 1. In his self-serving account Thirteen Days,
the
U.S.
President's
brother
Robert F. Kennedy, stated: "[President Kennedy] had
ordered the Pentagon to make all the preparations necessary for further
military action. Secretary [of Defense Robert] McNamara, in a
confidential
report, had listed the requirements: 250,000 men, 2,000 air sorties
against the
various targets in Cuba, and 90,000 Marines and Airborne in the
invasion
force...Troops were rapidly moving into the southeastern part of the
U.S.
equipped and prepared. Arrangements were begun to gather the over a
hundred
vessels that would be needed for an invasion." (Kennedy, Robert F.
[1969]. Thirteen Days. New York: W. W. Norton.) (Historical photos from Cuba: "Cien Imagenes de la Revolucion Cubana, 1953-1996," Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado; Instituto Cubano del Libro; Editorial Arte y Literatura. Havana, 2004. Photo from UBC: Ubyssey) Fidel Castro: My Life -- A Spoken Autobiography
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In the world today, U.S.
imperialism still gives itself the right to try to
force every other country to do U.S. bidding or be attacked. Current
examples
include Syria and Iran. In both cases, U.S. imperialism is trying to
dictate what
these countries can or cannot do within their own territories. Cuba, on
the
other hand, has consistently called for non-interference in the affairs
of both
Syria and Iran. In the current climate, countries would do well to
emulate
Cuba's many examples over the past fifty years of staunchly defending
its
sovereign rights and the rights of others in the face of aggression.
This just
stand has always been an integral part of the Cuban people's heroic
struggle
for the better future that they want to achieve, free from outside
interference.
 U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson makes presentation to the Security Council, October 25, 1962. |
A: Well, there was that famous debate, which I would categorize as embarrassing, between the American ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, and the Soviet ambassador, Valerian Zorin. Stevenson [(in 1st ed.:) -- as Colin Powell did on 4 February 2003, with false evidence in that case, to justify waging war on Iraq --] made a spectacular presentation to the United Nations Security Council in which he showed large aerial photographs of the strategic missile bases. The Soviet ambassador denied the evidence, denied that the proof was authentic. He rejected the debate. It was all ad hoc, all improvised -- the man wasn't prepared to debate. He didn't attack, didn't denounce, didn't explain the powerful reasons that Cuba -- a small country under constant threats both explicit and implicit from the superpower, under assault -- had for requesting aid, and the USSR, faithful to its principles and its internationalist duties, for providing it, and he got himself all tangled up in a mediocre argument that stemmed, ultimately, from the vacillations and public mishandling of the issue by Khrushchev in the months leading up to the crisis. He made the mistake of rejecting the real debate, which should have been over the sovereignty of Cuba, its right to defend itself, to protect itself. That was on 25 October 1962.
Q: Meanwhile, I believe the Americans were still flying reconnaissance flights over Cuba, weren't they?
A: Yes, they were. They kept overflying the island, and they were allowed to do so with impunity, despite the anti-aircraft batteries that had been installed precisely to prevent that, prevent the open, brazen spying on our territory, observing every detail of our defences.
So they continued to send the U-2 spy planes, and they also started making low-altitude flights. We decided to fire on the American planes that had started making those low-level flights. You can't detect flights at more or less treetop level - it makes it easy for there to be a surprise attack. We pointed this out to the Soviet military officers in charge there, we told them that the low-level flights shouldn't be permitted. We had previously informed them that we were going to shoot them down. And we opened fire with anti-aircraft artillery.
On 27 October, in Oriente province, a battery of SAM missiles operated by the Soviets fired on and brought down a U-2 spy plane. It was at that point that the moment of maximum tension occurred. The American officer Rudolph Anderson, the pilot of the U-2, was killed. That was the sign that combat had practically begun. At any time, another incident could have occurred, and could have led to all-out war. And let me repeat that in Cuba, the people were very calm.
Q: Did you think at any point that war was inevitable?
A: Well, it was a very tense moment. And we ourselves thought that conflict was inevitable. And we were determined to take that risk. It never occurred to us to give in to the adversary's threats.
Q: But the Soviets did give in.
A: At that moment of maximum tension, the Soviets sent a proposal to the United States. And Khrushchev didn't consult with us about it. They proposed to withdraw the missiles if the Americans would withdraw their Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Kennedy agreed to the compromise on 28 October. And the Soviets began to withdraw the SS-4s. That seemed to us absolutely the wrong decision. It occasioned great indignation.
Q: Did you have the impression that the agreement had been reached behind your back?
A: We learned from news reports that the Soviets were making the proposal to withdraw the missiles. And it had never been discussed with us in any way! We weren't opposed to a solution, because it was important to avoid a nuclear conflict. But Khrushchev should have told the Americans, 'The Cubans must be included in the discussions.' At that moment they lost their nerve, and they weren't firm in their determination. Out of principle, they should have consulted with us.
Had they done that, the conditions [of the subsequent agreement] would most certainly have been better. There would have been no Guantanamo Naval Base; there'd have been no more high-altitude spy-plane reconnaissance ... All of that offended us a great deal; we took it as an affront. And we protested. And even after the agreement, we kept firing on the low-level flights. So they had to suspend them. Our relations with the Soviets deteriorated. For years, all this had an influence on Cuban-Soviet relations.
I haven't wanted to tell you in great detail all the steps we took during that crisis, but it can't really be understood in all its political, moral and military aspects without the letters exchanged between Khrushchev and me during those days.
I'll start by reading you the letter I sent to Khrushchev on 26 October 1962:
Dear Compañero Khrushchev,
After analysis of the situation and the reports in our possession, I consider aggression to be almost imminent -- within the next twenty-four to seventy-two hours.
There are two possible variants: the first and most probable is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of destroying them; the second; which is less probable though entirely possible, is invasion. In my view, this variant would demand a large force and is also the most repugnant form of aggression, which may deter them.
You may be sure that we will offer firm and determined resistance to an attack, whichever the case. The morale of the Cuban people is extremely high, and we will face the aggressor heroically.
I wish in these moments to give you, very briefly, a personal opinion.
Should the second variant take place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the intention of occupying [the country], the dangers of this aggressive policy for humanity are so great that after such an event the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists might carry out a nuclear first strike against it.
I say this because I believe that the imperialists' aggressiveness has become extremely dangerous, and if they do indeed perform an act so brutal and in such brazen violation of universal law and morality as invading Cuba, that would be the moment to eliminate that danger for ever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defence. However hard and terrible the solution might be, there is no other.
This opinion is influenced by my having observed the evolution of this aggressive policy, the way the imperialists, in defiance of world opinion and [considering themselves] above principle and law, have blockaded the seas, violated our air space, and are now preparing for invasion, while they thwart every possibility of negotiation, despite knowing of the gravity of the situation.
You have been and are a tireless defender of peace; I understand how bitter these hours must be for you, when the results of your superhuman efforts are so seriously threatened. Until the last moment, however, we shall maintain our hope that peace may be salvaged, and we are willing and ready to contribute whatever may be within our reach [to achieve that goal]. But at the same time, we are ready to face with serenity a situation which we see as very real and very imminent.
I convey to you once again the infinite gratitude of the Cuban people to the Soviet people, who have been so generous and fraternal with us, and our profound gratitude and admiration to you [personally], as well as our desires for success in the enormous task and grave responsibilities that you have in your hands.
Fraternally,
Fidel Castro
On 28 October Khrushchev sent a reply:
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro,
Our message to President Kennedy on 27 October allows for a solution to the matter in your favour and to defend Cuba against invasion, the outbreak of the war. Kennedy's reply, which, evidently, you are familiar with as well, offers securities that the United States not only will not invade Cuba with their own forces, but will not allow their allies to do so. With this, the president of the United States has replied positively to my messages of 26 and 27 October 1962. [ ... ]
For the time being, however, it is not law that rules but rather the lack of sense of the militarists in the Pentagon. Since an agreement is in sight, the Pentagon is looking for a pretext to thwart it. This is why it organizes provocative overflights. Yesterday, you shot down one of them, yet previously you did not when they flew over your territory. That step will be used by aggressors to their advantage, to further their aims.
We send you, and your entire
collective direction, our
greetings,
N. Khrushchev
That same day, 28 October, I replied:
Dear Compañero Khrushchev,
Our government's position with respect to your message is contained in the statement formulated today, whose text you are surely familiar with.
I would like to clarify something with regard to the anti-aircraft measures we have adopted. You say: 'Yesterday, you shot down one of them [the spy planes], yet previously you did not when they flew over your territory.'
Before, there were isolated violations without any clear military purpose or real danger stemming from those flights.
Today, that is not the case. There was the danger of a surprise attack on certain military installations. We decided that we could not simply sit back and wait for a surprise attack. With our detection radar turned off, potential attackers could fly over the objectives with impunity and totally destroy them. We did not believe we should allow that, given the cost and effort that had been expended, and also because it would greatly weaken both our military and our morale. It was with that motive that on 24 October Cuban forces mobilized fifty anti-aircraft batteries, which was our entire reserve, to support the positions held by Soviet forces. If we wished to avoid the risk of a surprise attack, the artillery had to have orders to fire. The Soviet Forces Command will be able to provide you with further information as to what happened with the downed plane.
Before, violations of our air space were conducted on a de facto basis, and furtively.
Yesterday, the American government tried to make the privilege of overflying our air space at any hour of the day or night official. We cannot accept that, because it is the equivalent of renouncing a sovereign prerogative. However, we do agree to avoid an incident just now which might do great harm to the negotiations, and we will give orders to the Cuban batteries to hold their fire, although only while negotiations are going on and without reversing the decision we announced yesterday to defend our air space. Both of us should, in addition, recognize the danger that in the current conditions of tension, incidents may accidentally occur.
I would also like to inform you that we are opposed, on principle, to inspections on our territory.
We are extraordinarily appreciative of the efforts you have made to maintain the peace, and we absolutely agree as to the need to fight for that objective. If that is achieved in a just, solid and definitive manner, it will have been an inestimable service to humanity.
Fraternally,
Fidel Castro Ruz
Khrushchev wrote to me again on 30 October:
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro,
We have received your letter of 28 October and the communications on the conversations that both you and President Dorticós have had with our ambassador ...
We understand that certain difficulties are being created for you because we have promised the government of the United States to withdraw the missile base from Cuba, on the grounds of [its being] an offensive weapon, in exchange for their commitment to set aside any plans for an invasion of Cuba by troops of the US or its allies in the Western Hemisphere and to raise the 'quarantine', that is, end the [naval] blockade of Cuba. This led to the end of the conflict in the Caribbean, which was complicated, as you well understand, by a conflict between two world powers and had threatened to become a third world war involving thermonuclear weapons and missiles.
As we understand our ambassador, there is the opinion among some Cubans that the Cuban people would have wished for a statement of another kind, and at any rate would not have wished for a statement on the withdrawal of missiles. ...
In addition, there are opinions that you and we have not sufficiently consulted with one another on these issues before taking the decision which you know. ...
Wasn't that consultation with us? We understood this cable as a sign of extreme alarm. If in the conditions that had been created, and also taking into account the information that the bellicose and unbridled militarists in the United States wanted to take advantage of the situation and attack Cuba, we had continued our consultations, time would have been lost and the attack would have taken place.
We have reached the opinion that our strategic missiles in Cuba became a kind of obsession for the imperialists: they became fearful and, out of fear that the missiles might be used, they might have risked taking action to eliminate them, either by bombing them or attacking Cuba. And one must say that they could have taken them out of combat. Therefore, I repeat, your alarm was entirely justified.
In your cable of 27 October you proposed that we carry out a nuclear first strike against the enemy territory. You, of course, understand what that would lead to. This would not be a simple attack, but rather the beginning of a thermonuclear world war.
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro, I believe your proposal to have been wrong, although I understand its motivation.
We have lived through the most serious moment, in which a thermonuclear world war might have broken out. Clearly, in that case the US would have suffered enormous losses, but the Soviet Union and the entire Socialist camp would also have suffered terribly. With respect to Cuba, the Cuban people, it is hard to say how it would have turned out. In the first place, the fires of war would have burned Cuba. There is no doubt that the Cuban people would have fought valiantly, but that it would also have perished heroically cannot be doubted. [ ... ]
Now, as a result of the measures we have taken, we have achieved the objective we set ourselves when we entered our agreement with you to send the missiles to Cuba. We have extracted from the United States the commitment that they themselves will not attack Cuba and that they will not allow their allies in Latin America to do so. We have extracted all that without a nuclear strike. [ ... ]
Naturally, in the defence of both Cuba and other Socialist countries we cannot confide in the veto of the government of the United States. We have adopted and will continue to adopt all measures to strengthen our defences and gather the forces needed in case of a counter-strike. [ ... ]
We believe that the aggressor has suffered a defeat. It was preparing to attack Cuba, but we have stopped that, and forced [the aggressor] to acknowledge before the world that it will not do so in the current stage. We judge this to be a great victory. The imperialists, of course, are not going to cease their fight against Communism. But we have our plans, too, and we are going to adopt our measures. This process of struggle shall continue so long as two political and social systems exist in the world, until one of them, and we know that it shall be our Communist system, conquers the entire world. [ ... ]
(Comrade Fidel Castro, we wish you all possible success, and I am sure that you will achieve it. There are still machinations against you, but we intend, with you, to take every measure to thwart them and to contribute to the strengthening and development of the Cuban Revolution.)
N. Khrushchev
On 31 October -- this is the last letter I'll read you -- I replied to Khrushchev in the following terms:
Dear Comrade Khrushchev,
I received your letter of 30 October. It is your view that we were indeed consulted before adoption of the decision to withdraw the strategic missiles. You based [your letter] on the alarming news you say you have received from Cuba and, lastly, my cable of 27 October. I do not know what news you may have received; I am simply referring to the message I sent you the night of 26 October, received by you on the 27th.
What we did in the face of the events, Comrade Khrushchev, was prepare ourselves to fight. In Cuba there was but one kind of alarm: the alarm that called our people to arms. When in our judgement the imperialist attack became imminent, I decided that I should communicate that news to you, and alert both the government and the Soviet [military] command -- since there were Soviet forces committed to fighting alongside us in the defence of the Republic of Cuba against outside attack -- of the possibility of an attack that it was not within our power to halt, although we might indeed resist it ...
The danger could not daunt us, because we have felt it hanging over our country for many years, and to a certain extent we have become used to it ...
The eyes of many men, Soviet and Cuban, who were willing to die with supreme dignity, wept when they learned of the surprising, unexpected and practically unconditional decision to withdraw the weapons.
You may not know to what degree the Cuban people were prepared to fulfil their duty to the patria and to humanity.
I was not unaware when I wrote them that the words of my letter might be misinterpreted by you, and so they have been, perhaps because you did not read them slowly and carefully, perhaps because of the translation, perhaps because I tried to say too much in too few lines. However, I did not hesitate to write. Do you think, Comrade Khrushchev, that we were thinking selfishly of ourselves, of our generous people ready to immolate themselves, and not, of course, unconsciously, but fully assured of the risk we ran? ...
We knew -- do not assume that we didn't -- that we might well be exterminated, as you insinuate in your letter, should a thermonuclear war break out. Still, that did not persuade us to ask you to withdraw the missiles, or ask you to give in. Do you think we wanted that war? But how were we to avoid it if the invasion had occurred? It was precisely because such an invasion was possible, that imperialism might thwart every solution -- and from our point of view, their demands were impossible to accept, by either the USSR or Cuba.
And if such an event had occurred, what was one to do with the madmen who unleashed the war? You yourself have said that in the current conditions, war will inevitably become thermonuclear war, and quickly so.
It is my position that once the aggression has occurred, the aggressors must not be given the privilege to decide when nuclear arms will be used. The destructive power of these weapons is so great, and the means of transporting them so swift, that the aggressor can count on a considerable initial advantage in his favour.
And I did not suggest to you, Comrade Khrushchev, that the USSR become the aggressor, because that would be worse than wrong, it would be immoral and unworthy of me. What I did suggest was that from the moment imperialism unleashed an attack against Cuba, and in Cuba [therefore, ] against the armed forces of the USSR stationed here to aid in our defence in case of a foreign attack, a response be given the aggressors against Cuba and the USSR in the form of an annihilating counter-attack ...
I did not suggest to you, Comrade Khrushchev, that the USSR attack in the midst of the crisis, as it seems from your letter you think, but rather that after the imperialist attack, the USSR act without hesitation and never commit the error of allowing the enemy to strike you first with nuclear weapons. And in that sense, Comrade Khrushchev, I maintain my point of view, because I believe it to have been a fair, realistic assessment of the situation at the time. You can convince me that I'm wrong, but you cannot tell me that I'm wrong without first convincing me ...
You may wonder what right I had to do so. I approached you without concern for how thorny it might be, following the dictates of my conscience, as befits a revolutionary inspired by the most disinterested sense of admiration and affection for the USSR ...
I don't see how I can say we were consulted on the decision made by you. There is nothing I could want more at this time than to be mistaken. I wish you were the one who was completely right. It is not several, a handful of Cubans, as you have been informed, but rather many, who are now living moments of indescribable bitterness and sadness.
The imperialists have already started talking again about invading the country, as proof of how ephemeral and little worthy of trust their promises are. Our nation's will to resist the aggressors, however, remains unshakeable, and perhaps more than ever needs to trust in itself and that will to fight.
We shall fight against adverse circumstances; we shall overcome the current difficulties; and we shall move forward -- and nothing will be able to destroy the bonds of friendship and eternal gratitude towards the USSR.
Fraternally,
Fidel Castro
These letters have been published before, but I thought it was a good idea to include them in this retelling today, at your request, of the events of the October crisis, because as I told you, it's not possible to fully understand our conduct during the crisis in all its political, emotional and military aspects without them.
Q: In September 199I, during a visit to Moscow by US secretary of state James Baker, Baker and Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev negotiated the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops from Cuba -- the Mechanized Infantry Instruction Brigade. Did they consult with you this time about that decision?
A: Consult! They never consult. By that time, they were falling apart. Everything they took out of here they took without consultation. In the October crisis, they didn't consult and they agreed to allow the withdrawal of missiles to be under inspection, under inspection by the United Nations, and we said, 'No, nobody comes in here to inspect. We will not authorize that. If you want to leave it's none of our affair.' So they invented this new procedure -- they inspected en route out, at sea. That was the cause of a pretty tense situation, the way they did it, but the USSR was still a superpower. We could talk about that for a long time - many mistakes were made; I've talked about this on other occasions.
Q: About this, one more detail. When the Soviets withdrew, in 1991, when they withdrew the Soviet brigade from Cuba ...
A: No, they negotiated that directly with the United States, without consulting us. They negotiated everything without consulting us. Now then, there was no reason to negotiate that brigade; both its personnel and its equipment had been weakened -- how could it fight, when the USSR was divided and falling apart and the brigade had personnel from all the different republics? Despite the fact that the Soviet troops were technically very well prepared, they're brave, they showed that in the Second World War. But by the time of the withdrawal the political situation in the former USSR was very bad.
Q: There, too, one might think that in exchange for withdrawing the Soviet brigade from Cuba, the Americans could have been persuaded to withdraw from the base at Guantanamo, right?
A: Well, I think that was possible only at the time of the October crisis, as I said. The concession could have been won easily, with a little equanimity and sang-froid, because the world wasn't willing to enter a nuclear war on a whim of the United States.
Q: A world war.
A: We put five demands on the table, among them a cessation of the pirate attacks [and] the acts of aggression and terrorism against us, although they went on after that for decades; a lifting of the economic blockade; [and] return of the arbitrarily occupied land on which the Guantanamo Naval Base was located. All those [concessions] could have been easily obtained, in that dramatic state of tension [the world was in], since, as I told you, nobody was willing to march into a world war on account of a blockade, a few terrorist attacks and a naval base that was illegal and on land occupied against the will of the Cuban people. No one would have gone into a world war for that.
The presence of the strategic missiles was a very strong reason for the United States and its allies to join together. But the important thing was that there was nothing illegal about an agreement with the Soviets to bring in the missiles [against] the real threat of an invasion that was already being planned, with all the pretexts in place. American historians, in their own archives, have all the papers to prove that -- the plans to invade us. So by the time the Soviets started talking about installing missiles as a way to guarantee our security, the American plan for invading Cuba after Girón was already drawn up; the pretexts for invading us had been prepared since February 1962, and the missiles, I believe, started arriving here in June.
Q: In the summer of 1962.
A: That's right, in the summer -- months later. It's very possible that the Soviets mentioned that, because they. tended to have quite a bit of information -- both superpowers had been spying on each other by every means imaginable for years. Through espionage or intelligence methods, the Soviets knew about the Americans' invasion plan. They didn't tell us they knew; they said they'd deduced it from Khrushchev's conversations with Kennedy in Vienna, etc., but knowing the Soviets, they knew.
There was nothing illegal about our agreement with the Soviets, given that the Americans had Jupiter missiles in Turkey and in Italy, too, and no one ever threatened to bomb or invade those countries. The problem wasn't the legality of the agreement -- everything was absolutely legal -- but rather Khrushchev's mistaken political handling of the situation, when, even though both Cuba and the USSR had the legitimate right, he started spinning theories about offensive and non-offensive weapons. In a political battle, you can't afford to lose the high moral ground by employing ruses and lies and half-truths.
I repeat: the act was absolutely legal, legitimate, even justified. It was not illegal. The error lay in the Soviets' lies and disinformation, because that emboldened Kennedy. Because Kennedy had real proof, which the Americans had obtained from air reconnaissance, in the photos taken from the U-2s, which had violated our air space, and was allowed to do so. If you install surface-to-air missiles, you can't let the other country fly over the territory they're supposed to defend. The United States doesn't allow any rival power to fly over its territory, nor would it have allowed a Soviet plane to overfly its missile sites in Italy and Turkey [although the Soviets did].
There were many political and military errors, and it's essential to talk about them, in order to explain what happened back then.
In October 1962, it wasn't that we authorized the pull-out, it's that we didn't take measures to keep them from pulling out the missiles, because [if we did] we were going to have problems with both the two superpowers, and that was too much for Cuba.
Q: It would have been too much!
A: We had control of the country, and no missile would have moved an inch if we'd decided they weren't going to, but that would have been stupid, it made no sense. What we refused to do was authorize inspections. We protested, expressed our displeasure, demanded those five [concessions].
But now, when the Soviets -- this is what happened, just the way I'm telling it -- negotiated with the Americans, within that policy, within that love affair that emerged during those difficult days, hot love in the middle of a cold war, the Soviets and the Americans agreed to inspections at sea instead of inspection on Cuban soil.
[...]
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